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Introduction
1 Coordination is the regulation of diverse elements of a system into an integrated and
harmonious operation. Coordination is thus the act of arranging, putting things in order,
or  making  things  run  smoothly  together.  In  many  settings,  the  price  system  can
effectively coordinate economic activities. However, there are many instances, e.g., when
there are few players, when the information is not complete, etc., in which the market
system cannot work properly and other means emerge to coordinate economic activities,
as other contributions in this special issue show.
2 In this paper, we are interested in a special type of coordination, based on collective
reputation,  in which otherwise independent firms share a common (regional  or else)
brand.  Reputation  has  long  been  recognized  as  a  market  force  that may  ensure
contractual performance (Klein and Leffler, 1981). When information on some traits or
behaviors of the parties involved in a transaction is missing, repeated transactions and
the emergence of reputation may correct market failures that would emerge in one-shot
interactions. Individual reputations, that is the reputation emerging for individual agents
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following their behavior, have long been studied and the literature is now quite large (for
an introductory survey see, for example, Bar-Isaac and Tadelis, 2008). The literature on
collective  reputation,  on the  other  hand,  is  rather  limited  in  general  (for  a  seminal
contribution see Tirole, 1996) and even more so for the agricultural sector, where there
are indeed many instances in which producers share a common brand. 
3 In  Europe,  probably  the  most  well-know  examples  of  collective  reputations  in  the
agricultural sector are the protected designations of origins (PDO) wines (formerly known
as Appellation d’Origine Contrôllée,  or AOC).1 PDOs, together with protected geographical
indications (PGIs), are the backbone of the geographical indications (GIs) system by which
the EU regulator has instituzionalized the link between the quality attributes of a good to
the geographic location in which production takes place, i.e.,  to the terroir.  Bordeaux,
Champagne, Chianti are some of the typical instances: wine producers in those regions
can sell  their  product  -  when produced respecting some shared rules,  i.e.,  cahier  des
charges,  - using the name of the region to make their product more recognizable and
possibly benefit from a better reputation. 
4 PDO wines may be the best known cases, but there are many examples in other food
industries,  for  instance  Camembert  or  Parmiggiano  Reggiano  cheeses,  Parma’s  ham,
Somerset Cider Brandy, etc. Historically, there is evidence that high quality agricultural
products of specific areas were associated with geographical names since the century BC
(Bertozzi,  1995).  These regional  brands allow agricultural  products  to be more easily
recognized by consumers, and in many cases ensure higher prices and returns to firms.
For these reasons, there is public recognition and support for these collective endeavors
by agricultural firms in many countries.2 
5 But collective reputation is not only regional brands. The members that deliver their milk
to  a  cooperative’s  processing  facilites  share to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent  collective
reputation. Membership into the Label Rouge label is another of numerous instances. All
these firms benefit from a shared reputation, but also risk from actions undertaken by
other firms associated with the collective brand that may finally affect their economic
well-being.
6 The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we discuss the functioning of these collective
brands, in particular the interactions among the firms that form and manage them, and
we  highlight  some  of  the  relevant  problems  of  collective  reputation  in  agricultural
markets. The law usually grants a group of firms (or agricultural producers) the authority
to manage the functioning of the collective brand: the group can decide on who can join
it, on the production rules and their monitoring/enforcement, on who should be possibly
expelled in case of violation, etc. 
7 Thus the PDO is owned and managed by the group on a democratic basis. However, firms
within  collective  brand  can  be  heterogeneous,  thus  with  different  incentives  and
different payoffs following the seizing of the market opportunities that the collective
endeavor may permit. Seizing these market opportunites often lead to choices that have
differential impacts on members, with some that are eager to seize these opportunities
and  others  that  are  reluctant,  possibly  afraid  that  these  choices  may  damage  the
reputation itself. We will illustrate some of these recent conflicts among members and
controversial choices that ensued, either by the group managing the PDO or by some
members that disagree with the majority’s decisions. Some of these controversial choices
even reached the media, witnessing the different positions and interests within these
groups.
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8 We look at the problems for the industry,  describing some recent cases,  but we also
consider some of the questions that policy-makers may face in this area, in particular
which governance or hierarchical structure of the collective reputation system, such as a
geographical indication, may be designed to resolve or reduce conflicts among different
interests, that is to possibly align their interests. We thus compare some examples of
different PDOs, highlighting some of the issues that emerge and that may warrant further
investigation. 
9 The second objective of the paper is thus to suggest some venues for research that could
help in designing better policies for collective reputations. After briefly reviewing the
literature  on  individual  reputation,3 we  discuss  collective  reputation  using  recent
developments in the economics of reputation, a vast and growing literature that can be
distinguished - in a very rough and arbitrary division - between models of imitation (i.e.,
the  low  quality  type  would  like  to  be  confused  with  the  high  quality  type)  and  of
separation, when the good type does not want to be confused with the bad type (Bar-Isaac
and Tadelis, 2008). 
10 We  discuss  some  aspects  of  the  problems  emerging  from  recent  controversies  that
involve firms belonging to collective brands,  and we illustrate some other cases that
share  some  of  the  main  features  explained  above.  We  will  argue  that  some  of  the
problems highlighted in the paper have not been yet thoroughly analyzed, in particular
the democratic-decision process and the heterogeneity across firms. We finally highlight
some  questions  that  would  deserve  investigation  for  policy-making  purposes  and
conclude the paper.
 
On the literature on reputation
11 There are many situations in which consumers may be uncertain about the quality of a
good until  after consumption,  as  is  the case of  experience goods (Nelson,  1970),  and
asymmetric information may lead to market failures (Akerlof,  1970).  Different market
solutions may emerge to mitigate these failures, and reputation has been recognized as
an effective means (Klein and Leffler, 1981). When a consumer cannot observe some of
the quality attributes of a good or service before consumption, she may rely on a firm’s
reputation4, that is on her beliefs about the quality that can be associated with that firm’s
product. 
12 The buyer indeed can gather information and form her beliefs from different sources,
such as direct observations of the seller’s past performance, experience with other firms,
reports from other parties (e.g., word of mouth), and others. There are different ways to
model  reputation  and  in  recent  years  many  contributions,  both  theorethical  and
empirical, have been published.
 
Individual reputation
13 If we focus on the information provided by past transactions, we can distinguish between
three  broad  classes  of  models  for  individual  reputation:  hidden  information,  hidden
action, and mixed models (Bar-Isaac and Tadelis, 2008).5
14 In pure hidden information models,  the seller  has  not  active role  in influencing the
outcome of a transaction, but the quality of the good depends however on the seller
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characteristics (type). In this class of models, reputation is modeled as the consumer’s
beliefs on the firm’s type. Beliefs are generally modeled as (posterior) probabilities, and
the updating of the beliefs (following Bayes’ law) is based on the success or failure of the
good,  i.e.,  the  personal  history  of  the  firm.  Reputation is  thus  modeled  as  the  pure
learning of the seller’s type, which is considered an undelying truth, not manipulable and
that can be learnt using past performance.
15 In pure hidden action models, the firm can be of a unique type, but the uncertainty on
quality  depends  on  the  firm’s  equilibrium  behavior.  In  other  words,  firm’s  quality
depends on its actions and the reputation is modeled as the beliefs that the consumer has
regarding firm’s equilibrium behavior. In this class of models, the repeated nature of the
transaction allows for reputation to establish and for punishment to be used in case of
deviations.  The  carrot  and  stick  approach  induces  firms  to  balance  the  short-run
incentive  to  shirk  on  quality  against  the  long-run  risk  of  losing  the  business
opportunities. 
16 In mixed models, possibly the more realistic class, the quality of the good depends both
on the type and on the actions of the seller. Reputation is thus represented by the buyer’s
beliefs on the type of seller and on the anticipated equilibrium behavior of different
types. When the seller knows her type, i.e., in signalling models, there are usually (at
least) two types: one type of firm, the strategic or opportunistic kind, who may decide
whether to produce high or low quality;  the other,  the commitment type,  who always
choose the same quality level. 
17 Mixed models can then be distinguished in two sub-classes. In the imitation models, the
commitment type always produce high quality, while the strategic type is the bad type
that may decide to produce high quality to be confounded by consumers with the good
type. In the separation models, on the other hand, the commitment type is the bad type
firm (in fact it is refereed as the inept type) which always produce low quality, while the
strategic type is the good type firm which may decide to produce high quality good to be
distinguished from the inept (bad quality) seller.
18 Notice that in all models there is a repeated game and hence what goes around, comes
around. However, while in hidden action models inadequate behavior faces retaliatory
punishment, in hidden information and mixed models the trick is done by beliefs: after
bad outcomes, consumers update their beliefs to take into account the higher likelihood
that bad quality will persist and become aware of the firms that sold bad quality (Bar-
Isaac and Tadelis, 2008). The outcome (or quality) of today is determined by the seller’s
action or type, but buyer’s beliefs are updated and hence outcomes influence also future
transactions. 
19 In the models of individual reputation, few factors can explain to what extent reputation
can be effective in sustaining efficient trade. First, the degree of uncertainty about the
seller. Then, the speed at which consumers learn from outcomes, for instance how fast
information travels across buyers.  Moreover,  the seller’s patience (her discount rate),
since  the  more  patient  the  seller  the  more  she values  the  future.  And  finally,  the
characteristics of demand, that make buyers more or less sensitive to reputation.
 
Collective reputation
20 While the contributions on individual reputation are very numerous and still burgeoning,
those on collective reputation are more limited (though increasing). Tirole (1996) is the
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seminal reference, representing one of the first contribution to model group reputation
as an aggregate of individual reputations. It is an overlapping generations model, with a
matching game, where each group member’s past quality is observed with noise. There
are three type of agents - honest, dishonest, and opportunistic - and the presence of the
honest type creates incentives for opportunistic to create a reputation. 
21 The general model comes with two variants: one in which the incentive to sustain the
reputation comes from the fear of direct exclusion by the trading partner, the other from
the fear of delegated exclusion, that is of being excluded from the group, for example by
being fired.  The model is quite general,  but it  is applied in two different settings,  to
explain corruption in social groups and quality in firms (a workers’ cooperative). 
22 Different results emerge, but the most interesting is probably that individual reputations
are  determined  by  collective  reputations,  and  vice  versa.  A  member’s  incentive  to
maintain  an  individual  reputation  is  stronger  the  better  the  group’s  reputation.
Reputational externalities are long lasting, and vicious circles may emerge, where new
members of an organization may suffer from the choices of their elders long after the
latter are gone. In the case of firm quality, mass firing (even of honest workers) may be
the  only  chance  to  recover  from  bad  reputation.  Moreover,  increased  competition
reduces  individual  incentives  to  sustain  reputation  and  hence  can  damage  firm
reputation.
23 Winfree and McCluskey (2005)  suggest  a  model  where,  contrary to Tirole  (1996),  the
number of firms in the group becomes important and individual quality is not observable.
The collective reputation is based on the group’s past average quality and it is seen as a
common property resource. In addition, like in other models with hidden action (e.g.,
Shapiro, 1983), the consumers observe past quality with a lag.6 In general, it emerges (like
with the case of a common property resource) that with the increase of the number of
members  the  incentives  for  each  individual  to  milk,  i.e.,  to  free-ride,  on  the  group
reputation increases.  They  consider  two possible  strategies  for  the  members:  with  a
minimum quality standard, the group can reduce or avoid free-riding, while with trigger-
strategies individual firms (since their quality is not traceable) would extract too much
from the stock of the collective reputation.
24 Some  recent  papers  have  looked  at  the  coexistence  of  private  (or  individual)  and
collective reputations. Landon and Smith (1998) estimate the impact of product quality
and  reputation  on  prices  and  decompose  the  reputation  impact  into  individual  and
collective reputation effects. With a modified hedonic model, they use data for Bordeaux
wines and find that the impact of reputation on prices is twenty-fold bigger than the
impact of current quality, thus suggesting a major role for reputation in price formation.
Moreover, collective reputation indicators play a significant role in price formation via
their impact on expected quality, and thus affect prices to the extent that they are good
predictors of quality. Overall, they also show that empirical models that include proxies
for individual and collective reputations are more predictive that either individual-only
or collective-only models, thus justifying the analysis of the dual impact of reputations.
25 Costanigro et al. (2010) suggest an empirical hedonic model to jointly analyze product,
firm and collective  reputations.7 Using data  from California  wines, they disaggregate
reputation  premia  into  different  quality  performances,  considering  not  only  average
quality but also consistency of quality and name longevity, in a model that nests specific
and aggregate names. They show that both average quality and consistency of quality are
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improtant. Moreover, reputation premia decreases as names become more specific, i.e., as
one goes from collective to individual to product reputations. Last, their data show that
the use of collective reputation is important for inexpensive wines, while in premium
wines specific names become more important. Indeed, they argue that when consumers
spend more for wine, the cost of making a bad choice, i.e., buying a bad quality wine for
high price, is higher and this justifies the higher search costs borne by consumers when
switching from aggregate to specific names.
26 Costanigro  et al.  (2012)  further  elaborate  on  the  coexistence  between  private  and
collective reputations and investigate their dual impact on the investment in quality by
the firms. Their dynamic game model nests Shapiro (1983) and Winfree and McCluskey
(2005) as special cases. They thus have state transition equations that proxy the evolution
of common beliefs: one set for private reputations, where the updating for the buyer is
based on the discrepancy between current and expected quality, with some exogenous
parameters for the information lag (as in Shapiro, 1983) and for the brand-visibility. In
the equation for collective reputation, the expected quality is the weighted average of the
group quality, with two variants of the model: one, as in Winfree and McCluskey (2005),
where  all  members  have  the  same  weight,8 and  another  in  which  some  firms,  the
reputational leaders, may have a greater weight.
27 They  parametrize  the  model  with  Californian  wines  data  and  run  simulations.  They
confirm  that  quality  and  reputations  increase  as  consumers  find  it  easier  to  learn;
however,  investment  in quality  may be inefficiently low without  coordination.  Using
quantile regression, they also confirm that private reputations become more valuable the
more expensive the wines are. Last, collective equilibrium reputations increase with the
presence of a reputational leader (however, the differences between the coordinated and
competitive equilibria increase with the magnitude of the leadership). 
28 Menapace  and Moschini  (2012)  extend the  Shapiro’s  (1983)  model  to  investigate  the
coexistence between collective reputations, in the form of geographical indications (GIs)
that focus on the use of names linked to the geographic origin of a product, and private
trademarks. They consider a model with an experience good, competitive equilibria, and
perfect  elastic  supply.  Regarding  geographical  indications  (GIs),  they  compare  two
institutional settings: the EU sui generis scheme, that is the collective reputations enforced
by the EU (Reg. no. 510/2006), which reveals the region of production and specifies some
production rules (cahier des charges, which they model as a minimum quality standard),
and  the  US  specification  marks,  which  reveal  only  the  production  region  (like  the
American Viticultural Area or AVA). 
29 They find that individual trademarks and collective GIs are complementary instruments
to signal quality. In addition, they show that GIs decrease the costs of establishing private
reputations. Moreover, the welfare gains accrue to consumers (in particular those with a
taste for higher qualities), because GIs reduce the costs of building a reputation, also for
entrants, and hence reduce the value of established reputations. Last, while both the EU’s
sui generis GIs model and the US model of certification marks mitigate the moral hazard
problem (by limiting the scope for opportunistic behavior when revealing some relevant
information), the EU model seems better to the extent that it discloses more information.
30 All  these  models  of  collective  reputation  are  in  the  pure  hidden  action  class.  One
noteworthy exception is the paper by Fishman et al. (2008), a mixed (hidden action and
hidden information) model, where firms know their quality and the strategic firms are
the good quality type, i.e.,  a model of separation. Collective branding is modeled as a
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group of m>1 firms of high-quality, marketing together their products under a common
brand name, but still retaining full autonomy regarding business decisions and profits, in
particular deciding individually whether to invest in quality. 
31 In  general,  the  returns  on  quality  investments  depend  on  how  well  consumers  are
informed  about  firm’s  past  performances:  for  instance,  with  word  of  mouth
communication, the number of consumers who have experienced the product in the past.
9 The critical  assumption of Fishman et al.  (2008) is that consumers evaluate a firm’s
quality on the basis of their overall experience with the collective brand and not only on
the  basis  of  its  individual  past  experience.  Collective  branding  thus  provides  more
information  because  a  consumer  can  now obtain,  for  each  member  of  the  brand,  a
number of observations equal to the number of members in the brand. 
32 They then show that a good brand reputation is more valuable to its members than a
good stand-alone reputation, i.e., this is the reputation effect of branding. However, there
is also a free-riding effect on the other members’ investment, and so the overall effect of
the collective branding depends on the interaction of these two opposing forces. Under
perfect monitoring, free-riding is precluded and cheating, i.e., non-investing, firms are
expelled. In this simple case, the incentive to invest increases monotonically with the
brand size and collective branding leads to higher quality. Without free-riding, increasing
brand  size  gives  more  observations  to  consumers  about  the  brand  type  and  thus
incentives to invest are greater than in a stand-alone case.
33 With imperfect monitoring, possibly a more realistic case, in which the brand is unable to
monitor and enforce investment of individual members, the reputation effect needs to be
stronger than the free-riding effect for the brand to induce more quality investments
than the stand-alone firm. This happens when the group is small and/or the expected
quality  from  investment  is  high.  Indeed,  if  the  brand  is  large,  the  collective  brand
incentive to invest  is  lower than that  of  the stand-alone firm,  because the marginal
contribution of an individual member’s investiment to the brand visibility and reputation
becomes negligible compared to the payoff from free-riding.10 
 
Critical choices for collective brands
34 Since at  least  the national  regulations on AOC,  the law has granted the authority to
manage  the  collective  reputation  to  a  group  of  producers  sharing  some  production
techniques  in  a  given  area.  The  group  decides  on  the  production  rules,  on  their
monitoring and enforcement,  on who can join or  who should be expelled in case of
violations,  etc.  The  collective  brand is  thus  owned and managed by  the  group on a
democratic  basis  and the firms can use the collective  brand,  alone or  together  with
private labels or brands. 
35 Quite a few of these groups have been facing different kind of choices that have lead also
to difficult decisions. Many citizens are aware of the existence of these collective groups
(e.g., as consumers of some PDOs), but not much is known about their functioning, except
in those few occasions in which news reach the media. Indeed, in some cases news of
conflicts among members or of controversial choices by either the groups managing the
PDO or by some members that disagree with the majority’s decisions (and that may leave
the PDO) are - possibly strategically - leaked into the media.
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Industry choices
36 In  the  cheese  sector,  for  instance,  in  the  Camembert  region,  there  have  been
controversies regarding whether to allow for the possibility to use pasteurized (instead of
raw) milk within the production for the Camembert de Normandie PDO. Pasteurization
has been proposed by large firms, in order to solve some food safety issues related to a
particularly resistant bacterium, Listeria. Unlike many other germs, Listeria can grow in
the cold temperatures of the refrigerator but can be killed by cooking and pasteurization.
Defenders of the staus-quo, in particular small cheese producers, argued that raw milk
was at  the origin of  the unique features of  Camembert de Normandie.  Following the
controversy, some producers left the AOC in 2007 and produce Camembert fabriqué en
Normandie. However, there have been some lawsuits for usurpation de notoriété, which
have yet to be settled (Le Du, 2014).11
37 Similar controversies emerged when Camembert cheese producers were asked to produce
a  private  label  version  for  a  major  retailing  firm.  Some  producers,  notably  the
Cooperative d’Isigny, were in favor, hoping to find a new market outlet for their products.
However, other producers, together with the Institute National des Appellations d’Origine
(INAO), were afraid that such a choice would banalize the Camembert brand (INA, 1997). 
38 Indeed, with the evolution of the retailing sector and the growing importance of private
labels, some PDOs were asked (or were faced with the fait accompli when some members
started) to produce for a retailing’s private label. The question of whether blending the
PDO’s  (or  any  collective  brand)  reputation  with  that  of  the  retailer’s  private  label
emerged probably for the first time with the case Roquefort Casino. The regulations of
the AOC Roquefort did not allow retailing firms to produce the cheese, but Casino in fact
was sourcing from a small producer in Roquefort. As it has quite long been recognized,
this tendency of the retailing sector is due to the fact that the geographic indications
have had the tendency to attract or reassure the consumer (ANF, 1998).
39 But other similar cases concern other EU countries and other agricultural products. One
recent example concerns Valpolicella, the second more important region for red wine
production in Italy. Firms in the area produce different types of red wines, but in the last
decades  Amarone,  a  strong  and  full  bodied  type,  has  been  the  most  valuable  wine,
fetching prices way above those for other types of wine coming from the same area and
varieties. 
40 Historically, Amarone was produced in well defined hilly areas, considered better suited
to give higher quality grapes. Over the years, however, because of an increasing demand,
Amarone production has been expanding to other areas as well, in particular in the plain
valleys,  where  yields  are  higher  but  quality  possibly  lower.  This  de  facto  situation
however contrasts with de jure one, that is the rule that allowed Amarone to be produced
mainly  in  the  classical  hilly  areas.  Therefore,  the  Consorzio  di  Tutela,  i.e.,  the  body
managing  the  Valpolicella  PDO,  has  recently  suggested  allowing  the  production  of
Amarone in plain valleys as well (dell’Orefice, 2013b). The proponents argue that the rule
was a typo in the original 1968’s cahier des charges; in addition, scratching the rule would
recognize what is the reality of production, since a lot of Amarone is already produced in
the plain areas (dell’Orefice, 2013a).
41 However,  many  firms,  notably  those  that  have  heavily  invested  in  the  Amarone
production  technology  and  that  are  also  better  known  worldwide,  are  against  the
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modification and argue vehemently that Amarone production should remain confined in
the hilly areas, where quality is higher (Guerrini, 2013a).12 Some of them also threatened
to leave the PDO (Guerrini, 2013b). The 10th of May 2013 the assembly of producers, after




42 These cases are far from being unique, but represent probably only the better known
instances  of  regional  brands  facing  critical  choices.  We  believe  that  most  of  these
different situations of conflicts within the brands share some common features. There is a
group  of  firms  using  a  regional  brand,  i.e.,  the  PDO,  and  the  group  is  formed  by
heterogeneous firms. With some simplification, there may be high quality types and low
quality types. There is a market opportunity that could be jointly seized by the PDO, such
as  a  new  market,  the  adoption  of  an  innovation  that  could  lead  to  a  cost-saving
technology or to a possible quality improvement (quality vs. tradition?), etc. 
43 To seize this opportunity, however, a decision needs to be taken by the group, e.g., a
change in the cahier  des charges.  But while some firms are in favour of adopting and
implementing the changes needed to seize the market opportunity, others are against
these  changes,  probably  worrying  of  their  bad  effects  on  the  collective  reputation.
Decisions  on  rules  (and  possibly  on  their  enforcement)  may  be  taken  with  some
democratic process, e.g., using majority’s voting. Finally, the group decides to seize (or
not)  the  market  opportunity.  In  the  new equilibrum,  new markets  may  be  entered,
innovations adopted, etc., with some member firms benefiting and other possibly losing
out, so that they may even decide to leave the PDO.
 
Heterogenity
44 Some of the critical features of these cases are still missing from the reviewed models.
First of all, members of the collective groups are heterogenous. Some are small, others
are big producers, like in the case of the cheese sector. Some are vertically integrated,
e.g., make their own wine, while others deliver their products to a private or cooperative
processing facility. Some are potentially of higher quality than others, because of location
(e.g., hilly vs. plain areas in some regions), technology adoption, tradition, know-how, etc.
Being heterogeneous, members may have different incentives and payoffs, which may
explain their positions and decisions. 
45 We believe realistic models should take heterogeneity into account in order to match
predictions  with  anedoctical  evidence.  For  instance,  one  would  expect  that  more
homogeneous  groups  should  be  less  conflict-prone.  One  might  explain  some  bad
equilibria or outcomes not necessarily based on the size of the group, as suggested by
Fishman et al. (2008), but on the relative importance of bad vs. good types in the group. In
fact, a small group may have problems because it is heterogeneous, notwithstanding its
small size. And vice versa, a relatively big group may still function rather well because it
is homogenous. 
46 Moreover, further investigation on the interaction between private reputation, collective
reputation, and heterogeneity may explain different outcomes observed in the industry.
Some good quality firms may prefer to rely only on their own reputation (i.e.,  much
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better individual than group history) and hence leave the group (and give up using the
regional brand) when the majority is formed of too conservative or lower quality firms. In
Tuscany, for instance, in the seventies some producers left the Chianti PDO (and their
required  Sangiovese  plus  local varieties  blend)  to  experiment  blending  with  other
international  grapes,  i.e.,  Cabernet,  Merlot.  These  experimentations  have  led  to  the
production of the so called Super Tuscan wines, that initially could be produced only
outside the PDO as table wines. Eventually, some producers have started a brand-new PDO




47 While some of the decisions regarding regional and collective brands are taken by policy-
makers,  at  the EU or national  level,  many others  are left  to the group of  producers
managing the brand. Usually these groups are governed with democratic decision-making
processes. However, different bylaws or statutory rules (e.g., whether a group needs a
simple or a qualified majority to modify some rules, or whether voting is proportional to
production or based on one-head-one-vote), governance structures (e.g., whether in a big
group members can vote directly or by means of elected committees), group composition
(e.g., whether a group is formed by a majority of small or big producers, or of high or low
quality producers), etc. may all influence outcomes and industry equilibria. For instance,
what equilibria emerge may depend on whether small (or low quality or traditional etc.)
producers  have  the  majority,  and  to  what  extent  they  are  free  to  decide  on  rules
according  to  their  best  interests.  In  general,  ceteris  paribus,  decisions  taken  with
different voting rules or structures may give very different outcomes, and so these issues
should be considered as well.
 
Tradition vs. innovation
48 The case of the Super Tuscan wines is interesting also because it shows the dilemma of
tradition vs. innovation. These experimentations had the objective of producing wines for
long aging, like the better known from Bordeaux. Some producers tried with Cabernet
and Merlot only, i.e., Sassicaia, in a terroir that was similar to the Bordeaux sub-region of
the Graves. But in other cases, e.g., Tignanello, producers tried the main local variety,
Sangiovese, alone or with a 15% of Cabernet-Sauvignon. 
49 Some of these experimentations were considered valuable and compatible with the cahier
des charges and so later on incorporated into the Chianti  rules,  while in other cases
producers preferred to continue selling them as table wines. However, thanks to these
innovations it has now become clear that Sangiovese has a great potential for producing
long aging wines, confirming Barone Ricasoli’s intuition and choices a century later. 
 
Restricted production
50 Another dimension which may be useful to consider when analyzing collective reputation
is the choice of production levels, in terms of quantity or cultivated area. Most of the
papers consider firms that produce only one unit of production when they decide on the
optimal quality level.14 However, it is well known that different practices may increase
yields but impair quality. In wine production, for example, if a vine-grower chooses more
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productive  clones,  pruning not  correctly,  or  putting too much fertilizer,  quality will
inevitably be compromised (Johnson and Robinson, 2001).15 Among the cheese producers
of the Bas-Normandie, the critical question recently posed was, indeed, whether they
should be producing more or producing better? (Le Du, 2014). 
51 Many,  if  not all,  regional  brands specify also the production area and producers can
benefit  from  the  regional  brand  only  if  they  belong  to  that  area,  on  the  claim  or
presumption that better or recognizable quality comes with belonging to the restricted
area. To our knowledge, the only paper that does not consider unitary production is the
model by Menapace and Moschini (2012),  where they have a perfectly elastic supply.
However, they recognize that some of their results, in particular that the positive welfare
effects accrue to consumers while producers have negligible or negative effects,  may
change in a model with restricted land.
52 Indeed, higher prices translate into higher rents for fixed factors, i.e., higher land values.
The land value differences for farms either inside or outside of PDOs areas can be very
high,  and often the source of  conflicts.  For  example,  in 2007 land values  within the
Champagne  area  were  up  to  50  times  higher  than  ordinary  land  just  outside  it.
Controversies (even lawsuits) over the delimitation of production areas have followed.
Some producers in villages located just outside the official Champagne area have argued
that  their  quality  is  comparable  (if  not  better)  than  that  of  the  villages  within  the
Champagne  delimitation  (Jefford,  2008).16 We  believe  it  would  be  interesting  to
investigate the effects of different productive levels (or delimitations of production areas)
on reputation and hence on quality.
 
Reputation-building costs
53 The costs of reputation-building may have a different impact on firms of different sizes. It
has been shown that larger firms benefit more from private reputation (Rob and Fishman,
2005). They may indeed find it profitable to use private brands and so they can rely on (at
least) two strategies, that is on their own individual brand and on the collective one. But
for  small  firms  the  problem  may  be  quite  different,  since  a  private  brand  with  an
individual reputation may be prohibitely costly to set-up. Sharing the costs of a brand
through a collective endeavour may then become interesting.
54 Indeed, it has been recognized that PDO regulation has proved successful in allowing even
small producers to benefit from a well-established reputation (Bureau and Valceschini,
2003).  More  recent  empirical  evidence  has  confirmed  that  small  firms  voluntarily
adopting a PDO in the dairy sector have a higher rate of survival compared to large firms
that may benefit more from economies of scale or own quality brands (Bontemps et al.,
2013). Even though the PDO-effect is less pronounced than the size effect, i.e., larger firms
have better chances to survive in the industry, it emerges that the benefit of the PDOs is
significant for small firms. Collective reputation can thus improve the competitiveness of
the small  agro-food firms.  However,  how costs  are shared is  another issue (see,  e.g.,
Crespi and Marette, 2001).
 
Value creation in vertical relationships
55 A successful collective reputation may attract consumers and as such be a useful tool to
retain value in vertical relationships. One recent case, taken from outside the agricultural
sector, is illuminating on the the role and the effects that collective reputation may have
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on this regard. A recent TV show (Dielhenn, 2014) has illustrated the different choices
made within the French coutellerie artisanal. 
56 Thiers  has  a  very  long  tradition  in  forging  blades.  There  are  archeological  reperts
showing that this activity was well pursued in the century. In recent decades, this long
tradition,  together with the diversification of production,  has permitted to the many
firms in Thiers to provide the majority of French blades and knives (Barriquand, 2008). In
particular, Thiers’ firms have been the main suppliers of Laguiole for long time. In 1994,
local firms have registered a collective brand, i.e., Le Thiers, managed by the Confrérie du
Couté de Tié, a group of firms that assign the right to use the brand to those firms that
follow the cahier des charges. When granted this right, a firm may put the collective
brand logo together with the firm bame on the blade.
57 Laguiole cannot claim such a long history - apparently, it all started in 1987, but the real
production jump started in 1987 - but on the other hand it is better known both in France
and abroad. L’abeille de Laguiole is thus a better known regional (informal, yet) brand.
However, in the last couple of decades many firms have chosen the low quality end, out-
sorcing production to Asia,  while  few others,  e.g.,  Forge  de  Laguiole,  have invested in
quality, creating individual brands that try to benefit from the common reputation and
retaining further  value by vertically  integrating all  production phases,  including the
forging  of  blades  traditionally  outsorced  (apparently  about  70% to  forges  in  Thiers)
(Parisien, 2013). 
58 To  increase  value  creation,  in  both  areas  good  quality  firms  have  thus  vertically
integrated: in Thiers downstream to produce the other knife components to sell not only
blades but complete knifes, in Laguiole upstream by forging their own blades. However,
while Thiers has chosen a more coordinated approach to build a collective reputation
from a centuries-old know-how, Laguiole is following an uncoordinated path of different
initiatives to possibly use the better known collective reputation.
59 Another interesting twist of the dispute between Thiers and Laguiole is represented by a
recent collective attempt of Laguiole firms to obtain the Indication Géographique Protégée
for their knives. However, French authorities so far have recognized Thiers’ contribution
by including both areas in the definition of the relevant IGP production area, and so
protests and lawsuits have erupted (Depeche (2014)). Following-up on this dispute and
comparing Thiers and Laguiole management strategies of collective branding may help in
understanding how better retain value in vertical chains.
 
What (self?) regulation
60 Some  of  these  missing  elements  may  be  needed  for  a  better  understanding  of  the
controversies  and equilibria we observe in the industry,  but  also to provide possible
support  for  policy-makers designing regulations.  There are issues over which policy-
makers  may  not  intervene,  otherwise  they  would  risk  limiting  firms’  freedom  of
enterprise, but some other issues may be investigated since they may provide interesting
and useful  insights.  There  are  at  least  three  set  of  questions  that  may prove  worth
pursuing. 
 
Collective Reputation in Agricultural Markets




61 First, the choice of the optimal monitoring system of the production and quality of these
collective groups. There may be different solutions to choose from. Some may be based on
private third parties,  like the case of anglo-saxone countries and those used in some
labels and conformity certifications. Others may be based on different public bodies (e.g.,
in  France  the  INAO,  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  the  Veterinary  services  and  the
Directorate for competition, consumption and frauds all control the PDOs (ANF, 1998); or
they may rely on a unique public body, which may represent either mostly the producers,
the consumers, or the citizens’ health. Finally, in some cases, even the firms belonging to
the PDO may be granted the authority to monitor the enforcement of the rules by all
firms using the brand.17 
62 It may be worth investigating what happens when the monitoring or enforcement of the
rules is  assigned to the firms managing the PDO.18 Should a different equilibrium be
expected  compared  to  a  monitoring  left  to  public  bodies?  Can  we  expect  different
monitoring or enforcement efforts depending on which type has the majority in the
group? One could predict  that  when a group is  formed mostly by low quality types,
because  of  history  and/or  bad  choices  in  the  past,  the  PDO may  be  stuck  in  a  bad
equilibrium outcome, e.g., lower quality investment levels; in addition, rules may be more
laxed,  and/or  enforcement/monitoring  less  strict,  because  it  may  become  politically
unsustainable otherwise. Some good types may prefer to leave the group or rely almost
exclusively  on  their  private  brand.  On  the  other  hand,  when  groups  are  formed
predominantly  by  good  quality  types,  we  may  observe  higher  reputation  (and
investment) for quality with possibly a stricter enforcement of the rules.  Low quality
types may find these rules quite costly, still they may choose not to leave the PDO since
they benefit from high collective reputation.19
 
The optimal shape of collective repuations
63 Another  set  of  questions  is  on  the  optimal  structure  of  the  system  of  different
appellations and the relationship between private and collective reputations. In the wine
sector, for instance, all EU appellation systems are based on the idea of the pyramid: at the
base the vin de table and the vin de pays (the Table wines of the EU), then the vin délimité
de qualité supérieure and finally the Appellation d’Origine Contrôlée, or AOC (the quality
wines produced in specified regions of the EU) at the top of the pyramid. However, even
within this common system, there are different models to look at, both in France and
elsewhere. 
64 Consider the PDO system for the major French wine regions. In Burgundy, within the PDO
system there is a hierarchy, which in fact represents a qualitative classification, of the
about  1000  land  plots  (the  climats)  available.  The  33  best  plots  are  the  Grand  Crus,
representing around 2-3% of the production, that are allowed to use only the name of the
climat, e.g., Romanée.20 The about 500 second-best climats are the Premiers Crus, which
represent less than 20% of the production. They can use the name of the premier cru and
the name of the village where they are located. Then, there are the appellations at the
village level (there are more than 50 and represent about 30% of wine production).21
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Finally, the regional or district appellations, e.g., Bourgogne, which are 22 representing
about 50% of lower quality production, that can use only the regional or district name on
the bottle label. These climats are usually located west of route N74.
65 In Bordeaux, the famous classification into crus (or growths, from first to fifth), is based
of the 1855 hierarchy which classified chateaux (the wine producing estates) and not
plots.  It  had mostly  estates  from the  Medoc  area  (except  for  Haute-Brion,  from the
Graves), and it has remained quite fixed over the years, with few new entries and some
exits.  In  addition,  few other  concurrent  classifications  (e.g.,  the  St  Emillion,  the  Cru
Bourgeois, etc.) have appeared, some also updated every decades or so, but overall not
sharing a common standard.
66 Both  the  Burgundy  and  the  Bordeaux  classifications  were  prepared  in  1855,  from
information coming mostly from wine merchants (but not only) who reported wine prices
that  then  were  probably  reflecting  the  quality  of  wines.  However,  in  Burgundy
agricultural holdings were very fragmented and the quality of the Pinot Noir wine was
very  heterogeneous  among  different  plots.  Moreover,  the  investigation  into  the
determinants  of  quality  and  the  mapping  of  the  area  had  a  long  tradition.  Wine
merchants were buying wines from different Burgundy areas, learned to distinguish the
quality of wines coming from different climats,  and so the prices of the grapes were
reflecting the quality potential of different plots.  In short,  still  nowadays the general
validity of the hierarchy is well supported by the market (Lewin, 2010).
67 In Bordeaux, on the other hand, wines were coming from different estates, not tied to
specific plots, and the 1855 classification was a freeze-frame of the prices that different
chateaux were fetching in the previous years. However, wines have changed a lot from
the Claret type that was traded in the first half of the century. In addition, many chateaux
have changed their  land compared to the situation in 1855.  For these reasons,  some
commentators  believe that  the Bordeaux classification system may represent  more a
marketing tool, if not a defiance of reality that can only damage Bordeaux’s reputation
(Lewin, 2009).
68 We believe that the Burgundy system, and its ability to accommodate and integrate the
different  appellations  and  hence  reputations,  is  quite  interesting.  The  idea  of  the
pyramidal system, with lower quality wines and regions at the bottom, is further applied
within the PDO. This allows a finer partition into different degrees of quality, where at
the base there are the regional PDOs and at the top the Grand Crus. These latter can
benefit  from the  common geographical  reputation,  probably  because  consumers  can
easily classify the wine tipology, and from their individual recognizability (only the top
performers  can  use  their  only  appellation)  that  signals  higher  quality.  And  lower
performers can benefit from positive spillovers from the top performers, who made the
wine  famous  in  the  first  place.  This  system therefore  appears  a  good  way  to  align
incentives and a suitable compromise to avoid conflicts between individual and collective
reputations. 
69 Some recent controversies in the wine industry in Italy seem to provide arguments to
support the idea that the Burgundy system may be better than a more horizontal, i.e.,
relatively big and homogeneous, one. An illuminating case is the Chianti Classico PDO,
where they recently introduced, not without discussion among different positions, a top
wine tier, called Grande selezione, which represents a category within the appellation
purposedly made for estate-grown wines.22 This seems an indication that further tiers at
the top may be needed to take into account heterogeneity within the appellation. Indeed,
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in the past few Chianti producers have chosen the lower category of vin de pays for their
top quality wines (Krebiehl, 2013).
 
Individual reputations: grand cru or domaine?
70 In principle, a more pronounced vertical structure may be more suitable when quality
differences, i.e., heterogenity, are important. However, it is not clear how to determine
and obtain the optimal degree of verticalization. The case of Burgundy, and of other PDOs
that have followed suit on that idea, e.g., the Barolo PDO in Piemonte and its menzioni
geografiche aggiuntive,  that is the possibility to add the village and the subarea to the
Barolo name (Rinaldi, 2012), shows that different tiers can be fruitfully accommodated
into a  collective (regional)  system,  where reputations can be shared at  the regional,
district, village or even plot level. 
71 Other instances, for example the case of Valpolicella, show on the other hand that quality
differences  within  the  same  PDO  may  be  accommodated  through  the  joint  use  of
collective and private reputations: while the broader collective reputation may indicate
some general  aspects of  the product,  i.e.,  its  typology,  the private brand may be the
market signal that the firm belongs to a top tier of quality. 
72 The main difference is that establishing a private reputation may require more costly
investments  than  being  in  the  top  tier  of  a  collective  one,  and  thus  such  private
reputations may be easier to obtain for larger firms. So the same shape or structure of the
collective reputation may induce more private brands in an industry with larger firms,
which seems consistent, for instance, with the findings of Costanigro et al. ((2010; 2012))
in the case of the California wine industry.
 
Modelling choices
73 In a stylized model, it may be interesting to investigate the effects of the possible choices
on quality and perceived quality (and hence on reputation), at the firm and collective
level.  The contributions we briefly reviewed are a good starting point to study these
different cases, especially when modelling the interactions between private and collective
reputations. In Fishman et al. (2008) the effect of the collective reputation is mainly based
on the group history and not much is left for firms personal history. In other words, once
belonging to a collective brand, the reputation of a firm depends almost exclusively on
the performances of all the firms in the group. Other papers, notably Costanigro et al.
(2012),  consider both group and individual histories,  but need to derive results using
simulations. 
74 To model  the interaction between the different  layers  of  reputation,  the idea of  the
combination of group and individual reputation (past performances) might be useful. The
question may be whether we can model a firm’s choices, between moving out of the PDO,
i.e.,  establish  a  private  reputation,  or  moving  up  within  the  PDO.  Allowing  a  finer
partition of the PDO, using for example something equivalent to the Grand Cru mention,
may induce (good) firms to remain within a particular PDO, especially the small ones that
otherwise would have to sustain the costs of establishing a private reputation. 
75 To conclude,  Fishman et al.  (2008)  model  the  collective  reputation with a  separation
model, since the group of high-quality firms establish the collective brand in order to
separate from the low quality firms, i.e., from those outside the PDO. However, it seems
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that within the brand itself there are also instances of imitation, when lower quality firms
inside the brand, e.g., those using a village appellation, try to benefit from the reputation
of higher quality climats, e.g., Premiere Cru, by extending the village name to include also
the better Cru name as well, as seems to have happened in Burgundy.23 Extending the
Fishman et al. (2008) or other approaches to model the different incentives to separate
from the lower quality and imitate the higher one may provide useful insights into these
and related problems. In addition, more theoretical work needs to be done to model the
interaction between collective and individual reputations. 
 
Concluding remarks
76 Coordination of  economic activities  can be reached with different means,  and one is
collective reputation, quite common in agricultural markets. Indeed, given the demand
for  differentiated  and  quality  products,  the  role  of  the  retailing  sector,  and  the
recognition of  regional  brands  by  the  policy-makers,  in  many situations  agricultural
producers share a brand, while remaining otherwise autonomus firms. 
77 These  collective  endeavours  allow  agricultural  producers  to  be  more  easily  jointly
recognizable,  often helping them to reach consumers and sometimes to obtain better
terms of  trade  within food chains.  By  spreading costs  among many firms,  collective
brands are a means to get access to differentiated markets. Moreover, small firms - that
otherwise would have problems establishing individual reputations - can democratically
find a venue to niche markets. Indeed, when well managed, collective brands improve the
competitiveness  and the chances  of  survival  for  many small  firms producing quality
products. 
78 However, collective brands are delicate organizations, that may improve competitiveness
but  that  also  face  difficult  choices  ahead.  New opportunities  are  emerging  and  will
emerge, such as new markets, new technologies, changes in consumer demand, and new
challenges  from  an  ever  evolving  and  demanding  retailing  sector.  Seizing  these
opportunities may be seen as vital in the short-run, especially in periods with low market
prices,  but entering new markets or finding new outlets may have a subtle long-run
negative impact on reputation. 
79 We have discussed some of the problems that collective brands have to face if they want
to seize market opportunities. With some collective brands, quality is often associated
with traditional practices, and innovation is seen thus as a threat to these traditions.
However, innovation can also bring forward better ways to interpret and enhance the
value of the same traditions, and so banning innovation tout-court may make everyone
worse-off. When choice is possible, it is probably better to share the collective reputation
with similar firms, for instance by scientifically zoning the terroir. However, since this
may imply restricting the production area, it may increase not only incentives to invest
in quality but also rents for the included firms,  to the detriment of  other firms and
consumers and an ensuing increase in conflicts between the brand and outside stake-
holders.
80 On  the  other  hand,  when  the  group  of  producers  within  the  collective  brand  is
heterogenous, conflicts emerge inside the group, as seen in the media. To align incentives
among  heterogeneous  members,  some  brand  configurations  seem better  fitting  than
others, but their suitability to different situations may need to be analyzed with a case-
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by-case  approach.  Whether  to  take  into  account  heterogenity  by  a  more  vertically
partitioned  collective  brand,  e.g.,  the  Burgundy’s  example,  or  with  the  interaction
between the collective and private reputations, may depend on the industry structure at
hand. With small firms, a more differentiated collective brand may be a good system to
align all firms’ incentives; on the other hand, in an industry with larger firms, private
brands may naturally emerge as complements to collective brands.
81 The  retailing  sector,  increasingly  more  concentrated,  is  also  more  demanding  on
upstream firms, thus asking for (but also providing) better services to consumers. Many
collective brands may face difficult choices when requested, for instance, to supply their
product for the retailer’s private label. Whether seizing these new market opportunities
is a good choice may depend on the overall effect on the consumer’s perception of the
collective brand, that is on the effect on collective reputation.
82 There are no easy-to-give answers or one single recipe to suggest for optimally behaving
and reacting to evolving market and retailing needs. There are different issues to take
into  account  and often multiple  tools  that  can be  used.  Some cases  were  discussed,
highlighting some common features that seem to be missing or not enough investigated
in existing economic models. The aim should be the design of the optimal collective brand
configuration  to  align  different  incentives  and  to  reach  an  efficienct  and  equitable
compromise among the different actors in the food chains. Problems are more complex
when firms are heterogeneous, but good practices exist and, together with the lessons
from bad experiences, they can be used to make informed choices by the industry and the
policy-makers. 
83 These problems are important for the food industry, but also interesting for economists,
and  in  this  paper  we  have  provided  some suggestions  for  future  research,  both  for
understading industry and market equilibria and for supporting better informed policy-
making.  Policy-makers  have  so  far  recognised  these  collective  endeavours  in  the
agricultural sector. Good regulations may protect useful institutions or organizations, but
they cannot isolate them from a changing world.  To avoid being accused of  unfairly
protecting some firms, sectors, or parts of the world24 without an agreed-upon and shared
rationale, economists may help by investigating how collective reputations may assure
quality products, better incomes for producers, but reasonable prices for consumers. We
believe that the tools of the economics of reputation may help in exploring these and
related issues.
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NOTES
1. Since  the  EU  Reg.  479/2008,  the  different  national  AOC  regulations  on  wines  have  been
harmonised across all EU member states and now they are referred as protected designations of
origins (PDOs) wines.
2. At the EU level, see the original reg. no. 2081/1992 and successive modifications (the last is reg.
no. 1151/2012 for protected designation of origin (PDO) and protected geographical indication
(PGI)). In 2010, there were 872 agricultural products protected with EU geographical indications
(excluding  wines),  for  a  total  sales  value  of  almost  16  billions  of  euro  (http://ec.europa.eu/
agriculture/quality/schemes/index_en.htm).
3. In this paper we do not consider the literature on geographical indications, since most of it
does  not  rely  on  models  of  reputation.  Moreover,  we  review only  published  papers,  i.e.,  no
working papers, with an exception.
4. Here we consider firms’ reputation, but the analysis can be extented to any seller or economic
agent.
5. This section is based on Bar-Isaac and Tadelis (2008), which represents a useful introduction to
this literature. A somewhat more technical and in-depth introduction is represented by Mailath
and Samuelson (2006), while Mailath and Samuelson (2013) is a recent technical survey.
6. Beliefs evolve through a pre-specified Markovian process, not with an endogenous learning of
quality like with Bayesian updating.
7. Castriota and Delmastro (2010) investigate the determinants of firm reputation taking into
account individual and collective reputation. Using data for Italian wines, they show the positive
effect of firm age, size, investments and collective reputation on individual firm reputation. They
also show that in cooperatives membership size decreases reputation.
8. In all the models referred so far, quantity is the same for all firms and often normalized to
unity.
9. Thus, the smaller the firm the less informed its customers are about its past quality. Small
firms may therefore be unable to effectively establish individual reputations on their own and
consequently will have little incentive to invest in quality. Here collective branding may come to
the rescue (Fishman et al., 2008: p. 2).
10. Castriota and Delmastro (2010) find that brand reputation is increasing in the number of
bottles produced but decreasing in the number of producers in the brand.
11. The court of Rennes was expected to decide on the case in the Fall 2014, after this article was
written.
12. Sandro Boscaini, owner of Masi Agricola, explained that I’m not convinced that Valpolicella
should be made outside the hills. The Classico region is historically one of small growers, but the
rest is 90% co-ops, and they try to minimise the differences between the original area and the
additional area. I’m not saying thay they can’t make great wine. But [increasing the size of the
AOC] has been a disaster for Valpolicella, driving it down in quality (Rand, 2013: 38).
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13. The decision was probably not a surprise, given that The voting system, which is based on
grapes production quota, has given an advantage to the bigger producers who were in favor of
the abrogation (Costanzo, 2013).
14. One  notable  exception  is  Fleckinger  (2007),  which  considers  a  Cournot  oligopoly  with
endogenously  differentiated  experience  goods  where  firms  compete  both  on  quality  and
quantity. The paper considers the case in which consumers know the average quality offered by a
set of producers but not the quality of a given producer, i.e., a situation intermediate between
the polar cases of perfect information and asymmetric information. It shows that competition
increases  total  marketed  quantity,  but  it  decreases  quality,  and  so  it  may  be  harmful  to
consumers (when the enforceable quality standards are low). Therefore, quality standards and
competition  are  complementary  under  a  collective  name.  Moreover,  among  one-instrument
policies, quantity regulation is the best regulatory tool.
15. Probably for these reasons, in many cahiers des charges for PDO wines and cheeses, there is a
limit on the yields per hectare or per cow, or there are other rules, e.g., no corn silage, that limit
yields presumably to increase quality.
16. Some commentators in fact argue that extending the Champagne area to other villages may
even lead to an increase in the quality of the production (see, e.g., Jefford, 2008).
17. This is for instance the case of Italy with the D.Lgs. no. 61/2010.
18. Saak  (2012),  using  a  model  of  homogeneous  agents,  moral  hazard  and  imperfect  public
monitoring, considers two other mechanisms to discipline members of collective brands. The
first is represented by social norms (peer punishment), to punish individual shirking detected
through local peer monitoring. The second is represented by food scares, that is the loss of public
confidence in the industry following isolated incidents of low food quality, which are efficient to
the extent that they also scare producers to sustain industry-wide norms of compliance.
19. Results may explain also why it might be better to have monitoring or enforcement left to
third parties, as established for example by the EU with the regs. no. 882/2004/CE, 1234/2007/CE,
607/2009/CE and 1308/2013/UE.
20. Using only the name of the grand cru without any other collective name is intended as a
distinctive sign of quality.
21. Producers can use the name of the village and possibly the name of the climat but in smaller
letters. Over time, the village denominations have started to add the name of their most well
known cru, using then a two-component hyphenated name.
22. Notice that the Chianti PDO is already divided into the Chianti Classico zone, formed by the
villages that were first included in the official production area, and the Chianti zone formed by
villages that joined later on.
23. In Barolo, for instance, following a lawsuit the firm Marchesi di Barolo was recently allowed to
add the Cannubi subarea name to the Barolo name on their wine label. However, the firm was not
strictly from the Cannubi Cannubi location, which was the most well known cru (Rinaldi, 2012).
Some commentators fear that the last verdict, which granted this firm the right to imitate, i.e., to
be confounded with, a more recognized cru, may only be bad for consumers in the long run, who
for the most part won’t know that Marchesi di Barolo Cannubi’s is from a particular, north-facing
parcel of land (Suckling, 2013) and so not from the better known location (Rinaldi, 2013).
24. See, for instance, the recent controversies in the ongoing TTIP negotiations (e.g., Economist,
2014).
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RÉSUMÉS
In agriculture, there are many instances of coordination obtained via collective reputation, such
as geographical indications, marketing and processing cooperatives, membership in labels such
as Label Rouge, etc. We discuss some of their problems in agricultural markets, where they are
managed  by  otherwise  independent  firms  through  a  democratic  decision-process.  After
selectively  reviewing  the  published  literature,  we  highlight  some  relevant  problems  for  the
industry and for policy-making and we suggest some venues for future research. 
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